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Preface
Many have questioned the decision to write about cooperation between enemies in warfare, but far from surreptitiously san-itizing the carnage of war or apologizing for its injustices, this 
project seeks to humanize it. In October 2017, I attended a conference at 
West Point fêting (and critiquing) Michael Walzer’s Just and Unjust Wars, 
on the occasion of its fortieth anniversary. It is a book read not only by 
philosophers and military ethicists, but also by every cadet in every Amer-
ican military academy. Soldier after soldier got up to recount the serious-
ness with which they studied this work, and one retired officer who had 
seen many deployments and battles in his time attested, “This book has 
been my constant companion for thirty years.” It was a humbling moment 
for those of us in the academy who also aspire to practical import, and in 
a similar vein, this project strives to both make sense of and contribute to 
the soldier’s experience.
My interest in issues of warfare was first piqued when I read a long news-
paper piece about soldiers coming home from the field and having diffi-
culty adjusting to civilian life: they felt out of place in the free- flowing 
disorder, disgusted at the excesses of commercial society, adrift with pur-
poselessness, and disheartened by the meaninglessness of people’s everyday 
trivialities.
The disconnect between soldier and civilian is part of the inherent ten-
sions in civil/military relations in liberal democracies. These conflicts will 
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never be fully resolved, as successful militaries must always be hierarchical 
to a certain degree, in a way that contradicts the freedom of liberal demo-
cratic life, yet liberal democracies rely on that hierarchy and submission in 
order to secure those liberties. This often has tragic results for individual 
soldiers who cannot find their place in society upon returning home. While 
more can be done for returning fighters, their displacement is all the more 
heartbreaking because it will always be necessary.
Similarly, the horrifying endeavor that is war will always be with us. 
No matter how much moral progress we make, the nature of humanity is 
such that someone will always be willing to use the final trump card of 
violence to settle a dispute. It is also the case that sometimes, brutality must 
be used in the service of justice: nonviolence can be highly effective, but 
only against regimes capable of feeling shame, of which there are but a few. 
Given that war cannot be eliminated, we must try to contain it, and this 
book explores some unexpected yet pervasive attempts to do so.
Warfare itself is rife with contradiction, one of the most notable of 
which is that its utter chaos coexists alongside orderliness and rules. In the 
same vein, fighters will butcher one another, yet simultaneously cooperate 
for various purposes with the very people they are trying to kill. These 
tensions are inevitable yet irreconcilable— but for those who fight and 
experience wars, all these phenomena exist at once seemingly without 
dissonance.
These valiant— and sometimes devastating— efforts between enemies to 
constrain warfare and impose some boundaries, order, and meaning on 
what is fundamentally a radical, anarchic, and lawless activity are in part 
analogous to the project of the Leviathan, who attempts to sublimate pri-
vate justice in favor of public right. For centuries, the global moral order 
has been struggling to constrain international anarchy, trying to solidify 
that first stage of instituting a Leviathan to govern over tribal violence and 
adjudicate questions of justice. Moral philosophy has tackled these prob-
lems in a global distributive context, but far more needs to be done in the 
global retributive context.
In the course of tracing the genealogy of the ethic of cooperation 
between enemies in warfare, this book takes a different approach than that 
of the dominant strands of just war theory today. The standard modern 
approach rests on two major premises: the moral equality between fighters 
and their acquisition of a collectivized moral status that permits them to 
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do what would otherwise be disallowed, namely, kill people. Since then, 
an alternative strand has rejected the special status and powers of the state, 
and sought to overturn this principle of moral equality of combatants by 
analogizing killing in war to domestic self- defense and connecting it to 
the philosophical and legal literature on killing innocents (e.g., causal, cul-
pability, or liability approaches). These have been largely or entirely phil-
osophical enterprises.
In contrast, by looking at the genealogy of agreements and contracts in 
warfare and their accompanying moral demands, by practicing “e.g. phi-
losophy” (in the words of Avishai Margalit) in order to integrate historical 
and theoretical ethical claims, I hope to shed more light on contemporary 
practices and normative expectations in warfare.
This genealogical exploration is an empirical project (unearthing a moral 
psychology, military sociology, and military and legal history) as well as a 
philosophical endeavor establishing what various recurring concepts (such 
as fairness, responsibility, legitimacy) mean both generally and with respect 
to war. I then seek to merge the empirical and philosophical by exploring 
problems with those conceptions and how they might be resolved both in 
theory and in practice.
Self- Imposed Constraint
While the international laws of war could be considered yet another form 
of hegemony imposed by stronger states upon weaker ones, they also 
make it harder to win, which is why even the more dominant countries 
and their fighters are constantly trying to break the rules and get away with 
it. Why would states and soldiers make it harder for themselves to win and 
end wars?
The rules were created and sustained at least in part by sincere beliefs 
that there are right and wrong ways to win, and that it matters both 
practically— e.g., in building good will and reciprocity with opponents, 
whether they end up as vanquished or conquerors— and morally.
The live- and- let- live system in World War I trenches could be the 
exception that proves the rule, but in fact, the very structure of modern 
war itself is a cooperative enterprise. Rather than being nihilistic, anarchic, 
or unconditional, war can be viewed (as often exemplified by Clausewitz) 
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as a legitimate tool of conflict resolution— a way of reaching sustainable 
agreement— because violence is often undertaken with broader political 
goals in mind. As such, decisions about going to war and even war as a 
whole become collaborative in nature, as wars are a way of determining 
who is effectively right.
Furthermore, norms of war rely on agreement on the existence and con-
tent of the laws of war, especially who they should apply to, who qualifies 
as a combatant, and so on. These questions have been asked throughout 
history, for example, which peoples deserve “civilized” warfare (e.g., fel-
low Greeks, fellow Chinese) and which do not, whether guerrillas or blacks 
fighting in the American Civil War qualify for protections under the laws 
of war, and similarly now whether terrorists warrant the same.
The answers to these questions affect the content of other types of 
cooperation. During the modern period (from the sixteenth century 
onward), the ethic of cooperation between enemies has become system-
atized in international laws and institutions, which themselves constitute 
a kind of cooperation. The development of international laws and its con-
comitant attempt to enforce them with supranational institutions have 
broader implications for the future of the nation- state system in interna-
tional politics.
Systematic cooperation between enemies is taken so much for granted 
that we hardly notice it: weapons bans, POW regulations, requirements to 
wear uniforms into combat, and protections for clergy and medics who are 
national military personnel, among others. These cases are especially inter-
esting because they developed before any widespread discussion of human 
rights. They are conventional, a practice that has been agreed upon. Why 
should medics, for example, be treated as neutral (so long as they do not 
pick up arms) even when they are part of a national military? Their jobs 
are essential to the war effort, and the very soldiers they heal may return 
to the battlefield and continue to fight.
These practices have many motivations, but one major goal was to min-
imize overall damage— although where the line is drawn can be arbitrary. 
The distinction between soldiers and civilians, for example, is a matter of 
convention. Historically, no such differentiation was made, even if women 
and children were spared more often than men, and when members of the 
civilian population contribute in varying ways to the war effort, as they 
inevitably do, the boundary between who is and is not a legitimate target 
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(e.g., munitions factory workers can be targeted, but medics cannot) is sub-
jective and a matter of agreement.
At this point, some context is required: (1) Cooperation in warfare is 
certainly not the norm: historically, and even in contemporary times, it is 
an anomaly in human history. Guerrilla, or “irregular,” warfare— indirect 
raids, ambushes, sabotage, and short skirmishes— has been and continues 
to be the dominant mode of combat for over 150 millennia. (2) Coopera-
tion in warfare is not a uniquely modern phenomenon. It has happened all 
throughout human history, on a variety of levels and in different forms, 
although the contemporary systematization of this cooperation through 
international law and institutions is distinctive. And (3) although the rules 
are not always obeyed— in fact, they are more often deliberately violated— 
and even if international law looks much less dramatic and interesting than 
tensely negotiated truces in muddy trenches, the systematization of coop-
eration at the interstate and international levels and the extent to which 
individuals do obey those rules in the field are enormously significant. It 
shows that moral considerations are possible even in the most horrifying 
of human activities, and between people who have much to gain from not 
cooperating with one another.
Secularization of Just War Theory
One challenge for contemporary just war theory is that it uses religiously 
derived principles— proper authority, just cause, and right intention, which 
are then constrained by last resort, proportionality, and probability of 
success— but without their religious foundations. For example, the prin-
ciple of right intention is meant to reconcile pacifist readings of Christian-
ity with the act of killing, and allows killing only for the purpose of 
attaining the just cause. It cannot be done with malice, out of revenge or 
self- interest, or similar motives, which then gets us the Doctrine of Dou-
ble Effect. But contemporary and secular concerns with justice beg press-
ing questions about the principle of right intention. For example, if justice 
is the primary principle, how important is the spirit with which a just action 
is committed? Does an improper motive make it any less just? It does in 
classical just war theory, because the conception of justice incorporates 
motive. In most modern and contemporary interpretations, however, it is 
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the institutional processes or outcomes that matter, and proper personal 
motivations— while helpful— are not strictly necessary for justice to be 
done.
Do the classical just war principles that ground contemporary just war 
theory need to be reestablished with some nonreligious foundations and, 
if so, what might those be? Such reconceptualization is particularly impor-
tant as the emergence of a language of rights— especially human rights 
since World War II— can cause problems for a crudely secularized version 
of just war theory. For example, one may have a right to not be killed, or 
a right to not be harmed in certain ways under human rights– based ethics 
of warfare, but that right may be contravened by accepted traditional/ 
contemporary just war principles. There are several influences at work, 
feeding into contemporary just war theory, and in order to better under-
stand the ethics of warfare, we have to unravel these influences and the 
relationships between them. We should recognize and explore where they 
intersect and where they are inconsistent with one another, because they 
push military ethics and just war theory in different directions and 
toward different— and sometimes contradictory— conclusions about 
acceptable ways and reasons to wage war.
One major operator in military ethics is the ethic of cooperation, which 
is at once pervasive, overlooked, and taken for granted. Understanding it 
can both better explain many of the contradictions in military practice and 
philosophy and offer some alternatives to help resolve those tensions.
The sum of the exceptions to the brutality of war is more than its con-
stituent parts, and they add up to an ethic of cooperation between enemies 
in warfare. This ethic is all the more surprising given its persistent coexis-
tence with the brutality of war. Sometimes, the ethic of cooperation over-
laps with other moral principles invoked in war, sometimes not. Repeated 
cooperation between enemies in no way diminishes the horrifying barba-
rism of 99 percent of warfare. Rather, these meaningful exceptions are an 
attempt to contain and make sense of war’s atrocities, even if frequently in 
vain. For a soldier, there are two ways to wage war. One can turn nihilis-
tic and cold. Said Green Beret commander Colonel Robert Rheault, whose 
murder and conspiracy scandal during the Vietnam War was a partial inspi-
ration for the character of Kurtz in Apocalypse Now: “I was at the top of my 
game when I was in combat. You don’t have the luxury to indulge your 
fear, because other people’s lives depend upon you keeping your head 
cold. . . .  When something goes wrong, they call it emotional numbing. 
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It’s not very good in civilian life, but it’s pretty useful in combat— to be 
able to get absolutely very cold about what needs to be done, and just stick 
with it.”1
Or one can try to salvage something from war. There are many differ-
ent stories that can be told about the history of war, the history of man, 
the history of rules in warfare. This is but a single story— but one that I 
think is true, insightful, and helpful.
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CHAPTER I
The Horrors of  War and the Nature  
of Cooperation
Across the ages, war is most often characterized in history and literature as the epitome of conflict, fought over an intractable disagreement that can only be settled by force, a last resort so pri-
mal and desperate that people inevitably lose their moral compass as it 
goes on. Despite the influence of just war theory and constraints of inter-
national military law, once fighting begins, it descends into an arena of 
anger, malice, deceit, subterfuge, and ruthlessness, as endless examples of 
massacre, rape, torture, and enslavement tell us: victors seize their prizes, 
and there is little room for rules or civility, much less morality.
Yet, throughout the story of human cruelty also run threads of mercy, 
kindness, and virtue, as well as, surprisingly, cooperation. Even at its most 
 . . .  you men of Harfleur,
Take pity of your town and of your people,
Whiles yet my soldiers are in my command;
Whiles yet the cool and temperate wind of grace
O’erblows the filthy and contagious clouds
Of heady murder, spoil and villany.
If not, why, in a moment look to see
The blind and bloody soldier with foul hand
Defile the locks of your shrill- shrieking daughters;
Your fathers taken by the silver beards,
And their most reverend heads dash’d to the walls,
Your naked infants spitted upon pikes,
Whiles the mad mothers with their howls confused
Do break the clouds, as did the wives of Jewry
At Herod’s bloody- hunting slaughtermen.
What say you? will you yield, and this avoid,
Or, guilty in defence, be thus destroy’d?
— SHAKESPEARE, HENRY V , 3.3
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horrific, there are not only ad hoc and coordinated attempts at moral action 
in warfare, but also repeated cooperation between enemies. By this, I do 
not mean alliances of convenience between antagonists against a mutual 
foe, à la “the enemy of my enemy is my friend” for the moment. Rather, 
adversaries often cooperate even as they are trying to kill one another.
Cooperation between enemy fighters takes different forms: it manifests 
in an exchange of prisoners, for example, or by wearing a uniform in order 
to make oneself a better target and help protect civilians in the process. It 
can be planned or institutionalized, or it can be a brief emotion, a fleeting 
moment, as when a sniper does not shoot an unsuspecting target because 
it seems unfair. The practice of cooperation ebbs and flows, but it can be 
traced throughout the breadth of warfare. Although many instances of 
cooperation are random, isolated incidents, they are not merely that.
These are meaningful exceptions to the brutality of war, and their sum 
total is more than that of its parts: they add up to what constitutes an ethic 
of cooperation between enemies in warfare, which is the idea that coop-
erating with the enemy in certain ways within war is the right thing to do 
and has moral purchase. This belief can rest on different grounds, includ-
ing a sense of warrior honor, human rights, or efficiency. Not only have 
instances of cooperation between enemies arisen time and time again, but 
some of its practices have been institutionalized into the international laws 
of war and the current Westphalian nation- state system.
There are two commonly held yet contradictory perceptions of war: 
first, cooperation is so commonplace in some areas that it goes unnoticed 
and its structures and corresponding behavior are taken for granted, nota-
bly in the institutional structure of international law. At the same time, it 
is also understood that war is so terrible that it cannot sustain morality; 
this makes it difficult to accept that there can be and is cooperation between 
enemies in warfare, because that requires some amount of honesty, trust, 
sincerity, and predictability that would be impossible if moral behavior at 
all were untenable.
It certainly appears as if mercy, much less ethical consideration, has no 
place in battle. Siege warfare, for example, hardly makes allowances for 
the well- being of the women, children, and elderly trapped inside cities. 
Everyone starved and suffered, and whoever survived after defeat would 
be hauled off to slavery, as Hector fears for his wife Andromache, in the 
Trojan War (The Iliad, 6.533– 55). Despite powerful and clever female gods 
who shape the course of human events, women on Earth are, then as now, 
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little more than property, spoils of war, loved only by their families. Mor-
tal women can drive martial aspirations, but usually inadvertently, through 
their seizure and trade— the most famous of all being Helen. Other women 
suffer the same fate: at first, Agamemnon refuses to ransom Chryses’s 
daughter back to him, declaring, “The girl— I won’t give up the girl. Long 
before that, / old age will overtake her in my house, in Argos, / far from her 
fatherland, slaving back and forth / at the loom, forced to share my bed!” 
Later, when he is coerced into relinquishing Chryseis, he demands that 
they “fetch me another prize, and straight off too, / else I alone of the 
Argives go without my honor,” which then sets in motion a series of cru-
cial developments in the rest of the war (1.33– 36, 138– 39).
Neither are there niceties on the battlefield, whether out of pity or 
greed. When Adrestus is captured, he begs for his life in exchange for a 
“priceless ransom.” Tempted, Menelaus is about to agree, when Agamem-
non intervenes:
 . . . “So soft, dear brother, why?
Why such concern for enemies? I suppose you got
such tender loving care at home from the Trojans.
Ah would to god not one of them could escape
his sudden plunging death beneath our hands!
No baby boy still in his mother’s belly,
not even he escape— all Ilium blotted out,
no tears for their lives, no markers for their graves!”
And the iron warrior brought his brother round— 
rough justice, fitting too.
Menelaus shoved Adrestus back with a fist,
powerful Agamemnon stabbed him in the flank
and back on his side the fighter went, faceup.
The son of Atreus dug a heel in his heaving chest
and wrenched the ash spear out.
(6.63– 77)
Although ancient Greece is often taken as the birthplace of  Western 
civilization, at times it can be hard to see how its predecessor— archaic 
Greece— also held the seeds of the modern warrior and modern warfare, 
even albeit through a long, circuitous, and inconsistent path. When one 
remembers, however, that the past century alone has seen the Nanjing 
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Massacre, the Holocaust, the firebombing of Tokyo, and torture in Abu 
Ghraib, among other countless horrors, the continuity is a little clearer, 
and the bloody rage and cruelty of the archaics and ancients now transition 
seamlessly to more recent atrocities.
Despite the litany of contemporary domestic regulations and interna-
tional laws, when war begins, it seems that any sense of morality goes too. 
Soldiers and civilians alike usually have little desire to make room for cour-
tesies when their lives are at stake, and understandably so. The essence of 
war is captured by images of frenzied, merciless, mutual slaughter between 
the Aegeans and the Trojans as told in The Iliad, rapes depicted in Goya’s 
The Disasters of  War, torture portrayed in The Battle of Algiers, or indiscrimi-
nate napalm bombing in Vietnam dramatized in Apocalypse Now.
War is a desperate, primal activity, and simultaneously seductive and 
addictive in the power one can wield to kill or to spare men’s lives. Says 
war correspondent Chris Hedges:
War breaks down long- established prohibitions against violence, 
destruction, and murder. And with this often comes the crumbling 
of sexual, social, and political norms as the domination and brutality 
of the battlefield is carried into personal life. Rape, mutilation, abuse, 
and theft are the natural outcome of a world in which force rules, in 
which human beings are objects. The infection is pervasive. Society 
in wartime becomes atomized. It rewards personal survival skills and 
very often leaves those with decency and compassion trampled under 
the rush.1
It seems war is so wretched that, however dressed up in uniforms, proto-
cols, and strategies, the trappings of civilization and adherence to ethical 
principles are impossible to sustain under such circumstances. It often begins 
with the simple desire to survive. Says Erich Maria Remarque, through 
his narrator Paul Bäumer in the fictional but exemplary All Quiet on the 
Western Front:
We have become wild beasts. We do not fight, we defend ourselves 
against annihilation. It is not against men that we fling our bombs, 
what do we know of men in this moment when Death is hunting 
us down. . . .  No longer do we lie helpless, waiting on the scaffold, 
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we can destroy and kill, to save ourselves, to save ourselves and to be 
revenged . . .  we run on, overwhelmed by this wave that bears us 
along, that fills us with ferocity, turns us into thugs, into murderers, 
into God only knows what devils; this wave that multiplies our 
strength with fear and madness and greed of life, seeking and fight-
ing for nothing but our deliverance. If your own father came over 
with them you would not hesitate to fling a bomb at him. . . .  We 
have lost all feeling for one another. . . .  We are insensible, dead men, 
who through some trick, some dreadful magic, are still able to run 
and to kill.2
It seems that blood thirst may naturally overtake man in combat, but it is 
not necessarily a pleasurable excitement. Most who have seen modern com-
bat abhor it. While many a soldier acclimates to existence in the theater 
and, after some time there, may find it difficult to live a regular civilian 
life,3 it is the rare soldier who has seen modern war’s horrific scale of 
destruction and still genuinely and singularly thrills at the fight.4 Said US 
general and later president Dwight D. Eisenhower, “I hate war as only a 
soldier who has lived it can, only as one who has seen its brutality, its 
stupidity.”5
A Very Brief History of  Warfare
For the bulk of human history, warfare has been a savage, scrappy, self- 
interested, no- holds- barred affair.6 Despite the implications of the name 
“conventional warfare,” it is in fact guerrilla, or “irregular,” warfare— an 
indirect approach utilizing raids, ambushes, sabotage, and short skirmishes— 
that has been the norm over 150,000 years of Homo sapiens history and the 
millions of years of hominids before that.7
Conventional war became possible only once agricultural societies 
developed, the first appearing after 10,000 bce in the Middle East (and 
several thousand years later elsewhere), when there was finally enough sur-
plus wealth and human population to sustain specialty weapons and forti-
fications and their skilled operators. Not until nearly seven millennia later, 
after 3100 bce, however, do the “first genuine armies— commanded by a 
strict hierarchy, composed of trained soldiers, disciplined with threats 
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of punishment, divided into different specialties (spearmen, bowmen, 
charioteers, engineers), deployed in formations, supported by a logistics 
service”— arise in Egypt and Mesopotamia.8 Pitched battle is the excep-
tion throughout history, even during its heyday in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries, as “most warfare involved hunting down unarmed 
enemies, slaughtering the men and raping the women, or perhaps enslav-
ing both men and women. Ambush, pillage, and wanton destruction were 
the norm,”9 because they minimize risk and maximize advantage.
Narrative Biases
Despite the historical rarity of conventional conflicts, however, almost all 
military histories tell the story of conventional war: its direct confronta-
tion is relatively new and of larger scale, so there is more of a historical 
record, and conventional warfare also supplies more readily identifiable 
characters and plot elements. Usually, the history is narrated chronologi-
cally, recounting major battles and the decisions of kings and generals, while 
describing geopolitical intrigues, significant technological breakthroughs 
and organizational developments, and moments of tactical genius.
Conventional fighting dominates our conception of war also because 
we desire definitive resolution and because it is seen as the most successful 
way to wage war, so most countries in the world try to emulate it to some 
degree.
Mixed Methods and Probable Paths to Victory
Over time, political entities have varied across warring tribes, kingdoms, 
empires, city- states, caliphates, and states, among others. Furthermore, each 
scientific improvement has altered the face of war, e.g., use of metal, domes-
tication of horses, evolution of the longbow, introduction of gunpowder, 
invention of ammunition belts for semiautomatic and automatic guns, and 
creation of unmanned aerial vehicles.
What is consistent across all these disparate eras is that people naturally 
seek military advantage in warfare, whether it is under the cover of night 
or through the element of surprise. One’s life is at stake, after all, and it 
chiu18244_2nd_i-326.indb   6 7/12/19   12:05 PM
T H E  H O R RO R S  O F  WA R  A N D  T H E  N AT U R E  O F  C O O P E R AT I O N   [ 7 ]
—-1
—0
—+1
would be foolish to take unnecessary risks with something so crucial. It is 
therefore unsurprising that guerrilla warfare has continued long after the 
advent of conventional warfare, and is still used alongside it. Although 
Thucydides tells the history of the Peloponnesian War as largely a series of 
conventional encounters centered between Athens and Sparta, irregular 
fighting was used throughout— there were only fifty- five major battles in 
a nearly thirty- year war, while within “the first few years the Athenians 
alone staged hundreds of low- level attacks on various locations”10— and 
contrary to conventional understanding, combat consisted more of “raid-
ing and killing, not formal war as previously defined by the Greeks.”11 This 
was not unusual: ancient Greek warfare in general used mixed tactics.12
Similar conjunctions occur at other times: Against the better- armed and 
- trained British (and Hessian) soldiers, the rebellious Americans preferred 
to seize what advantages they could in the Revolutionary War. General 
George Washington’s army ambushed Hessian mercenaries while they 
slept (and not because they were inebriated) in the Battle of Trenton, which 
was a standard approach for Washington. In fact, he did not employ clas-
sical massed infantry maneuvers for the bulk of the war— between 
August 27, 1776 (Battle of Brooklyn, which he lost), and October 19, 1781 
(Siege of Yorktown, which he won, outnumbering the enemy two to one)— 
instead preferring ambushes and strategic retreats.13 Says historian David 
McCullough, the Revolutionary War
wasn’t beautiful gentlemen of the 18th century in beautiful 18th- 
century costume. . . .  Soldiers very often in rags, very often with no 
shoes. . . .  Legendary stories about leaving bloody footprints in the 
snow in Trenton and other places were all true. They were hungry, 
they were starving, and they were down by the end of the year to 
3,000.”14
The French- Indian War (1756– 63) that Washington had fought in earlier 
was mostly “wilderness warfare,” far different from the Eastern part of the 
country where there was little wilderness left:
He had no experience whatever in fighting . . .  pitched, formal-
ized battles of the 18th century. . . .  It took him a while to catch on 
that if he came out and faced these English regulars, professional 
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troops, who by the way were extremely courageous themselves— 
and they weren’t commanded by aristocratic pinheads . . .  another 
 misconception— . . .  that you can’t fight them that way, and to 
figure out that the point isn’t to protect cities or hold New York or 
hold New Jersey. The point is to keep the army alive and fighting. 
And it also took the British a while to figure that out: the way to 
defeat these rebels was to get the army— forget about taking Phila-
delphia or New York . . .  just go get that army and kill it.15
The most compelling reason for the persistent use and staying power of 
guerrilla warfare is that it is highly effective. It leveled the Mesopotamian 
and Roman empires, and overwhelmed considerable portions of the Chi-
nese and British empires, among others.16
Guerrilla warfare is also always available as a weapon of the weak, as the 
militarily disadvantaged still have a chance to win if they do not meet their 
foe head- on. It can inflict enormous damage without having to maintain 
and manage a large bureaucracy, it has low start- up and shutdown costs, and 
guerrillas can carry on low- intensity insurgencies for long periods of time. 
Even today, although conventional fighting looms large in our imagina-
tion, guerrilla action is still the dominant mode of warfare in the world.
Considerations of Morality and Justice
Although it is usually in the context of guerrilla or irregular warfare that 
the modern citizen thinks of martial chaos, anarchy, and lawlessness, the 
same moral atrocities abound in conventional warfare as well, perhaps even 
more so: rape, torture, summary execution of prisoners, enslavement of 
captives, indiscrimination that does not spare or perhaps even targets civil-
ians, and tortuous killing (e.g., chemical weapons), among others.
The rules and structures of conventional warfare do not immunize one 
to bloodlust or intoxication by war. People are driven to kill one another 
for any number of reasons— especially competition, diffidence, and glory, 
says Thomas Hobbes17— and the impulse may quite literally be in our 
nature. Violence has been prevalent since perhaps the beginning of soci-
ety, and some evolutionary studies suggest that aggressiveness is an adap-
tive trait that allows people to successfully compete for limited resources.18
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Evolutionary Influences
Interestingly, an inclination for cooperation may have evolved alongside 
that for warfare.19 There are evolutionary advantages to trust and altruism 
between close relatives or those in long- term relationships,20 and it may 
also pay off evolutionarily to have faith in and be generous with strangers 
with whom one is in society, as there is always uncertainty about whether 
a particular interaction is a one- off.21 Beyond that, there may even be a 
tendency toward “strong reciprocity”: the willingness to sacrifice resources 
to reward those who are kind and to punish those who are not, even with-
out prospects of future material rewards for oneself.22 Ironically, some of 
this genetic drive to altruism may have been made possible by warfare. In 
fact, self- sacrifice in favor of group (rather than individual) selection may 
quickly make population rates plummet, but when there is war, higher 
levels of altruism and thus the self- sacrifice gene may become more 
sustainable.23
All of this altruism and self- sacrifice is happening within groups, how-
ever. Even between nonkin or strangers in these groups, there are still 
shared traits (e.g., culture, nationality, etc.) that delineate some kind of 
meaningful boundary for group members, and the benefits are doled out 
among them. As evidenced by countless wars, it seems that such altruism 
shown to insiders only intensifies the viciousness that is meted to outsiders.
At the same time, although mortal enemies kill one another much more 
often than not, there are individual instances of pity and kindness shown 
to enemy soldiers in the midst of barbarism. I mention just two of many 
examples here. Decorated World War II Luftwaffe pilot Franz Stigler 
decided to not shoot down an American B- 17 because he saw that the tail 
gunner had already been killed and the survivors were busy aiding their 
injured, whereupon he not only spared the crew but also escorted the plane 
to safer airspace, at great risk to himself.24 During the Iran- Iraq War in the 
1980s, young Iranian soldier Zahed Haftlang encountered injured Iraqi 
soldier Najah Aboud in a bunker during a battle and reached into the Iraqi’s 
pocket to loot from him, but found a Qur’an and a picture of Aboud’s 
girlfriend and her son. “Because of his family and by that photo, he changed 
my mind,” says Haftlang, “I made a decision to save him.” Aboud remem-
bers, “Right away he changed into a human, not an enemy, not a killer.” 
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Haftlang gave the Iraqi painkillers, hid him underneath corpses for three 
days until the battle ended, and then took him to a military hospital. 
Recounts Aboud, “I never hear about Iranian soldiers saving Iraqi soldiers 
during the fighting. I never see him again.”25
Furthermore, there are strong informal regulations for cooperation 
between enemies in other violent contexts, for example, mafia codes of 
conduct such as omertà, a kind of “honor among thieves” that frowns upon 
assisting legal authorities to interfere with even one’s rivals and enemies. 
In the midst of intense conflict and horrendous violence, there are not only 
pockets of cooperation but moreover whole systems.
Iterated Games and Empathy
It was not, then, for fear
that I didn’t kill you: it was— not to die myself!
Not to die in you: you were my twin
or seemed so in the twinned trench.
— FAUSTO MARIA MARTINI, “WHY I DIDN’T KILL YOU”
Some of the more amazing stories of cooperation in warfare come from 
the trenches of World War I. How did its brutal, nonsensical slaughter— 
which ultimately killed over nine million soldiers across all theaters— yield 
the Christmas truces in 1914 (and to a lesser extent in 1915), during which 
not only did one hundred thousand British and German soldiers unoffi-
cially stop fighting but also, in some places in Belgium, German soldiers 
who decorated their trenches with candles and trees and sang carols were 
met with British soldiers singing in kind? Eventually, the two sides min-
gled in No Man’s Land, exchanging gifts, food, and souvenirs, and even 
engaging in short, casual football games.26
It was not just ad hoc cooperation on a shared holy day: opposing trenches 
also spontaneously developed systematic cooperation over time with a “live 
and let live” arrangement. Trench warfare was a significant but not par-
ticularly interesting aspect of World War II military tactics— rather, it is 
noteworthy for what fighting did not happen. The famous timed shellings 
between some trenches in World War I was part of a system of reciprocal 
exchange of services that allowed each side to anticipate and avoid attacks 
and minimize casualties. It took different forms during the war: truces 
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lasted anywhere from a few minutes to several months, and some were 
explicit agreements between fraternizing soldiers in close quarters, while 
others were indirect, over long distances, and involved large numbers of 
people.27 The existence of these truces is surprising, but, notes J. Glenn 
Gray, a World War II army officer and later philosophy professor, “It is 
a  great boon of front- line positions that . . .  disobedience is frequently 
possible, since supervision is not very exact where danger of death is 
present.”28
Historical evidence for the truces is strong. There were numerous reports 
and even the occasional photo of people walking openly above trenches 
and of unrestricted movement in and out of the trenches; of Germans fry-
ing sausages and Brits frying bacon in the trenches, despite the fact that 
smoke from the fires would have attracted gunfire on active fronts; and of 
“quiet” fronts when there was no shortage of ammunition. In some trenches, 
soldiers hunted and retrieved small game, harvested vegetables, kept dairy 
cows for fresh milk, and had pianos and books. The British 33rd Division 
reportedly sent someone to the village each afternoon to purchase eggs, 
oats, fresh milk, and fruit,29 and the British 1st Royal Berkshire Regiment 
and its opposing German unit delivered newspapers to each other.30 All 
this would have been impossible without cease-fires of some kind. Some 
field reports explicitly referenced truces,31 as well as other direct declara-
tions, such as a sign on a notice board appealing, “Today is BANK HOLI-
DAY Tommies. Do not fire— give us a rest,”32 or soldiers’ letters describing 
the front:
Without at all “fraternizing”— we refrain from interfering with 
Brother Bosch seventy yards away, as long as he is kind to us. . . .  All 
patrols— English and German— are much averse to the death and 
glory principle; so, on running up against one another in the long 
wet rustling clover, both pretend that they are Levites and the other 
is a Good Samaritan— and pass by on the other side, no word spo-
ken. For either side to bomb the other would be a useless violation of 
the unwritten laws that govern the relations of combatants perma-
nently within a hundred yards of each other.33
We suddenly confronted, round some mound or excavation, a 
German patrol. . . .  We were perhaps twenty yards from each other, 
fully visible. I waved a weary hand, as if to say: what is the use of 
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killing each other? The German officer seemed to understand, and 
both parties turned and made their way back to their own trenches. 
Reprehensible conduct, no doubt.34
The man Mike gave some useful hints on trench work. “It’s the Sax-
ons that’s across the road,” he said, pointing to the enemy lines 
which were very silent. I had not heard a bullet whistle over since I 
entered the trench. On the left was an interesting rifle and machine 
gun fire all the time. “They’re quiet fellows, the Saxons, they don’t 
want to fight any more than we do, so there’s a kind of understand-
ing between us. Don’t fire at us and we’ll not fire at you.”35
Truces arose where there was general reluctance to fight, usually out of a 
combination of self- interest and empathy. If fired upon, parties would 
return fire, but both sides preferred to “let sleeping dogs lie.” Eventually, 
the threat of legal sanctions for explicit truces led to tacit ones.
Internal Sanctions
High command did not look favorably on this inactivity, for obvious rea-
sons, so in the latter half of the war, they exerted more direct control over 
the trenches, for example by ordering specific raids. Soldiers adapted by 
ritualizing their aggression and conforming with the letter, but not the 
spirit, of the commands. They would deliberately aim their rounds high, 
enemy patrols would pretend to not see or follow routes such that they 
would not encounter one another, and shooters would fire into No Man’s 
Land instead of into trenches or shell the same place or at the same time 
every day so that the enemy could avoid that area or schedule to suit. Such 
ritualized aggression still looked like battle from the outside, and reassur-
ing reports could be sent to high command about the times and duration 
of the battles and how much ammunition was spent.
The internal struggle between command and the front escalated 
throughout the war, with high command wanting soldiers to put them-
selves at risk and soldiers trying to find ways to avoid fighting and dying. 
The truces were hardly easy to maintain. Penalties for treachery were 
severe, of course. In addition, high command kept trying to break up the 
tacit collusion by rotating people off the front more frequently. Within the 
chiu18244_2nd_i-326.indb   12 7/12/19   12:05 PM
T H E  H O R RO R S  O F  WA R  A N D  T H E  N AT U R E  O F  C O O P E R AT I O N   [ 13 ]
—-1
—0
—+1
troops, the artillerymen, who were further back and bore less risk, wanted 
real battle, so it was difficult for the trenchmen in front to hold on to the 
truce.36 In an almost perfect example of an iterated game for survival between 
predator and prey— although here high command and soldiers were ostensi-
bly on the same team despite their conflicting aims— each side continually 
sought and found new ways to adapt to and outwit the other’s response.
Anywhere from 13 to 40 percent of all trench tours— and overall about 
33 percent— practiced some form of “live and let live” at some point.37 That 
is a significant percentage of the fronts and an extraordinary number of 
truces, many of which involved no direct communication between the 
enemies.
Deterrence
This is not to say that serving in the trenches was not a brutal experience 
and that life there was comfortable or safe— far from it. Even when a truce 
was in place, it was not all fun and games or cuddly cooperation. Underly-
ing the truce, and holding it together, was always the threat of destruction 
should someone secede from the agreement. For example, ritualized 
exchange of fire sometimes took the form of repeatedly “just missing” the 
target. This did not harm the enemy and maintained the truce, but simul-
taneously showed him that you had the range and accuracy to kill him 
should peace break down.38
Where “live and let live” arose, its motivations evolved along with its 
forms. At first, everyone had the same but not shared goal of winning the 
battle and leaving the trenches alive, but eventually, some started sharing 
the implicit goal of subverting the system, which was the only way they 
might survive. The ability to sustain at length such complex and uncoor-
dinated cooperation between warring parties— usually without direct com-
munication, while individuals constantly rotated in and out, and sanctions 
were imposed both between enemies and within each side— is impressive, 
to say the least.
“Live and let live” is admittedly fairly unique, and made possible partly 
because of the structure of trench warfare— this kind of cooperation did 
not develop in other wars that employed different tactics. Trench warfare 
just happens to have a structure that makes for relatively clean iterative, 
cooperative games of this sort. Trench warfare’s rigid and transparent 
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structure allowed for easier conspiracy, and the “live and let live” arrange-
ment that evolved shows cooperation in its distilled form. Robert Axel-
rod’s The Evolution of Cooperation (1984), which drew from his and evolu-
tionary biologist W. D. Hamilton’s 1981 paper, reveals how tit- for- tat games 
and structures apply to many different scenarios and can shape the devel-
opment and behavior of the actors within, including soldiers trying— or 
rather, not trying— to kill one another in the trenches.
It does not mean that fellow feeling or the desire to cooperate does not 
exist in other circumstances; it is simply more diffuse or on a smaller scale 
(e.g., not sniping a man when he is taking a cigarette break, or trying to 
not kill women and children), and more difficult to organize.
Shared Humanity
Although the warring states stoked their populations’ nationalistic passions 
by dehumanizing the enemy, most trench fighters were conscripts with lit-
tle at stake in the conflict. Initially moved by rousing propaganda, these 
“ignorant armies clash by night,”39 but once they experienced war in its 
full misery, many found that they preferred to save themselves. And once 
they recognized the humanity of their enemies across the way, the struc-
ture of trench warfare allowed them to collaborate with one another in 
this Prisoner’s Dilemma scenario, and they were willing to spare their 
opponents for the sake of their own survival.
Fictional German conscript Paul Bäumer understands the necessity of 
killing the enemy, but at various points feels a certain pity and even empa-
thy for them. He acknowledges the suffering of some Russian POWs and 
recognizes their cruel twists of fate:
A word of command has made these silent figures our enemies; a 
word of command might transform them into our friends. At some 
table a document is signed by some persons whom none of us knows, 
and then for years together that very crime on which formerly the 
world’s condemnation and severest penalty fall, becomes our high-
est aim. But who can draw such a distinction when he looks at 
these quiet men with their childlike faces and apostles’ beards. Any 
non- commissioned officer is more of an enemy to a recruit, any 
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schoolmaster to a pupil, than they are to us. And yet we would shoot 
at them again and they at us if they were free.40
Later, trapped in a foxhole with the body of a man he killed, Bäumer regrets 
his actions:
Comrade, I did not want to kill you. If you jumped in here again, I 
would not do it, if you would be sensible too. But you were only an 
idea to me before, an abstraction that lived in my mind and called 
forth its appropriate response. It was that abstraction I stabbed. But 
now, for the first time, I see you are a man like me. I thought of your 
hand- grenades, of your bayonet, of your rifle; now I see your wife 
and your face and our fellowship. Forgive me, comrade. We always 
see it too late. Why do they never tell us that you are poor devils like 
us, that your mothers are just as anxious as ours, and that we have 
the same fear of death, and the same dying and the same agony— 
Forgive me, comrade; how could you be my enemy? If we threw 
away these rifles and this uniform you could be my brother.41
Bäumer never made good on his promise to his dead enemy- turned- 
comrade in the foxhole, but others did in real life.
The mutual subversion between enemies of “live and let live”— clean 
and highly structured, in many ways— is unusual and surprising, but not 
infrequent when comparable circumstances present themselves.
There is similar but less- developed behavior in trenches elsewhere in 
World War I,42 as well as precursors some fifty years earlier in the Ameri-
can Civil War— fittingly, as tactics there presaged European trench war-
fare in many ways— where fraternization between the two sides was not 
unusual.43 One example comes, surprisingly, from the ferocious Korean 
War (1950– 53). American military doctor Otto F. Apel recounts the rare 
sounding of an air raid alarm one day that panicked everyone, because the 
United States had already gained air superiority early in the war. At first, 
nothing happened, and then a plane appeared, but it was not a Soviet MIG- 
17. Instead, it was an open- cockpit biplane with a solo North Korean aviator 
who twice passed over the tents so closely “we could see his face clearly. He 
looked back at us just as we looked at him. He tossed something from his 
cockpit, presumably a hand grenade, and it fell harmlessly to the ground 
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and exploded a safe distance from us.” This spawned much discussion that 
night, of course, and
an epidemic of Monday morning quarterbacking swept the MASH. 
If we had just been ready with the quad- 50s [antiaircraft weapons] . . .  
one burst would have chewed that biplane to bits. Whose fault was it 
that we did not give him a proper welcome? How did we let that 
commie get away? Next time, just wait till next time!
The incident repeated itself twenty- four hours later, at 4:00 pm the next 
day, but
this time he wore a pair of sunglasses and a nice white scarf around 
his neck. In the breeze, the scarf trailed back from the leather helmet 
like the tail of a comet, giving him a World War I ace look. . . .  Instead 
of greeting him with quad- 50s, we waved our hands and shouted 
greetings as he went by on his first pass. On his second buzz, he 
dipped his wings to return our wave. On he went, climbing skyward 
and tossing his payload from the aircraft. We shook our heads and 
laughed as we strolled back to the tents. In a moment we heard the 
explosion way out in the field. We did not even look back.
“Bedcheck Charley,”44 as 8076th MASH dubbed him, came regularly at 
4:00 pm every day until
as suddenly as he had appeared, his visits ceased. We felt a bit like a 
friend was gone. It occurred to us that someone had ordered him to 
bomb the MASH and continue bombing it until it was no longer 
operational. In a touch of compassion, this lone North Korean refused 
to carry out the insane orders to bomb a hospital. Perhaps he reported 
that his mission was accomplished. Perhaps they knew what he was 
doing and relieved him of the mission. Perhaps even his military 
superiors recognized that what he was ordered to do was inhumane 
and they were touched by a sense of humanity. We will never know. 
He never reappeared.45
This ad hoc, mutual self- restraint was far less systematic than “live and let 
live” in World War I trenches, but its appearance even in the midst of the 
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particularly brutal Korean War is testament to the possibility of the ethic 
of cooperation in warfare.
Similar phenomena occur at other phases in conflict. “One of the com-
monest features” of siege warfare negotiations between city- states in 
Renaissance Italy during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries was “the 
idea of a delayed surrender,” in which a town under siege would agree to 
capitulate if help had not arrived within a set period. In the meantime, “the 
siege would not be pressed [and the attackers] could look forward to avoid-
ing the most dangerous exercise of all— storming a well fortified city,” 
while the besieged hid their belongings in the event that relief never came.46
The warring parties were small principalities constrained by a rough par-
ity between them, so realistically, they could not expect to “annihilate 
their rivals,” but rather hope only to “achieve security and predominance 
within clearly defined spheres of influence.” As a result, “battles were cal-
culated risks, fought to gain advantage not overwhelming victory.”47 While 
the settled terms of delayed surrender were not always later honored, the 
frequency of these negotiations indicates some dynamics similar to those 
in the World War I trenches: mutual advantage to be gained from not fight-
ing and some expectation of repeated future interaction.
Why Cooperate?
一將功成萬骨枯。
Yi jiang gong cheng wan gu ku.
One general’s honor is 10,000 soldiers’ white bones.
— CAO SONG, “JI HAI TWO POEMS” (TANG DYNASTY)
《己亥歲二首僖宗廣明元年》年代:唐。作者:曹松
One major motivation for “live and let live” is, unsurprisingly, ordinary 
soldiers realizing that they are being condemned to die for no greater pur-
pose than someone else’s vainglory or petty feuds. Their memoirs are filled 
with lengthy treatments of the abuse they suffer at the hands of senior offi-
cers. On only the third page of his collected letters, Pvt. William Wheeler, 
who fought with the Duke of Wellington’s armies in the early nineteenth 
century, describes a superior officer who “delighted in torturing the men, 
every man in the Corps hated him, when once a soldier came under his 
lash it was no use for any officer to plead for him”; only a few months later, 
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he recounts unfair punishments meted out by commanders and, separately, 
reports that “I have at length escaped from the Militia without being flead 
alive.”48
A significant portion of World War I Italian officer Emilio Lussu’s mem-
oir, A Soldier on the Southern Front, is devoted to relating how senior offi-
cers frequently sent soldiers on obviously foolhardy and suicidal missions, 
such as crossing No Man’s Land to cut the enemy’s barbed wires in broad 
daylight, because the officers had recently arrived on the front and did not 
understand the war, or did not care and simply wanted to see something 
being done under their watch. Says his trench- mate Ottolenghi:
Our real enemies are not beyond our own trenches. So first, about- 
face, then onward . . .  all the way to Rome. That’s where the ene-
my’s general headquarters is. . . .  It seems to me that our generals were 
sent to us by the enemy to destroy us. . . .  Where is our enemy? That 
is the question. The Austrians? Obviously not. No, our natural ene-
mies are our generals. . . .  His Excellency General Cadorna . . .  is not 
anywhere near here. And neither is the commander of our army. Even 
the commander of our army corps is far away, hiding out at the foot 
of the high plateau.49
There are many such moments, in this war and every war, in which ordi-
nary soldiers recognize that they pay the price for the machinations of kings 
and generals in which they have no stake.50 In the course of that realiza-
tion, they may appreciate that they have more in common with their enemy 
than with their own officers who are fellow countrymen— and so in order 
to save themselves, they become willing to cooperate with an unknown 
enemy by “living and letting live.” Naked self- interest, once it is realized, 
can operate at different levels and lead in different directions.
Is cooperation between enemies possible even when it is not clear that 
self- interest is being served? In the World War I trenches, the anonymity 
of fighting between large, modern nation- state armies cut both ways: it 
allowed soldiers to hold pernicious perceptions of strangers and to kill them 
with hardly a thought for their opponents’ humanity, but it also let them 
acknowledge their shared attributes and interests, in opposition to their own 
officers. Ironically, limited personal contact with the enemy can compare 
favorably to the extensive but contentious and often abusive personal 
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interaction with one’s officers or troop mates, and that opens some space 
for such mutual recognition.
In a strange way, modern warfare is not really about killing. Violence, 
says Carl von Clausewitz, is simply a way of imposing one’s will on another 
person. Like wrestlers:
Each tries by physical force to compel the other to do his will: his 
immediate object is to overthrow his adversary and thereby make him 
incapable of any further resistance. War is thus an act of force to compel 
our adversary to do our will. . . .  Force, that is to say, physical force (for 
no moral force exists apart from the conception of a state and law), is 
thus the means; to impose our will upon the enemy is the object. To 
achieve this object with certainty we must disarm the enemy, and 
this disarming is by definition the proper aim of military action. It 
takes the place of the object, and in a certain sense pushes it aside as 
something not belonging to war itself.51
This builds to his famous statement that war is merely the continuation of 
policy with other tools,52 just one instrument among many. As violent 
action is a means to an end, not a good in itself, if the outcome could be 
achieved without killing a single person, so much the better.
This then leaves room for other dynamics and motivations to operate, 
even if not always efficiently, in the service of warfare, such as upholding 
a sense of honor or protecting the weak and innocent. The self- interest of 
“live and let live” can also emerge in that space, and is just one rationale 
for conspiring with the enemy. Other collusions include sparing women, 
children, and other innocents or treating POWs according to some inter-
national standard, each of which grows out of its own complex of motives, 
as we will see.
What Is Cooperation?
Cooperation is a fraught concept, with different definitions and uses grow-
ing out of rich traditions such as evolutionary biology or game theory that 
can inform one another.53 In fact, Axelrod begins The Evolution of Coop-
eration with an exploration of World War I trenches’ “live and let live.” The 
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broader field of conflict theory, started by Thomas Schelling’s The Strategy 
of Conflict (1960), looks at war as a form of negotiation involving signaling, 
communication, coordination, and bargaining, with asymmetric behavior 
and knowledge.
The Limits of Game- Theoretic Analysis
Analysis with game theory can be so compelling that in some fields, coop-
eration in warfare is thought of only in game- theoretic terms. Formaliz-
ing cooperation through game theory both gains and loses some insights, 
however. Its rationalistic approach captures some aspects of cooperation 
between enemies and certainly enhances our understanding of institu-
tionalized international laws of war agreed upon between states, for 
example. But it does not necessarily enlighten us on other aspects of col-
laboration, including cooperating even to one’s own detriment and its 
underlying complex of motivations such as virtue, honor, ideology, moral-
ity, and altruism. Game theory can help show that some form of ethic of 
cooperation exists in warfare, but it cannot encompass or explain the 
entirety of that moral impulse at the individual or institutional levels.
It behooves us to remember that no matter how rational one’s approach,54 
war itself is always grounded in some kind of emotion. Says Clausewitz, 
who is often mistaken for holding and advocating a purely rational approach 
to warfare:
Conflict between men really consists of two different elements: hostile feeling 
and hostile intention. . . .  We cannot conceive the most savage, almost 
instinctive, passion of hatred as existing without hostile  intention . . . . 
Among savages intentions inspired by emotion prevail; among civilized  peoples 
those prescribed by intelligence. But this difference lies not in the intrinsic 
nature of savagery and civilization, but in their accompanying circumstances, 
institutions, and so forth. . . .  Even the most civilized nations can be pas-
sionately inflamed against one another. . . .  How far from the truth we 
should be if we ascribed war among civilized men to a purely rational act of 
the governments and conceived it as continually freeing itself more and more 
from all passion, so that at last there was no longer need of the physical exis-
tence of armies, but only of the theoretical relations between them— a sort of 
algebra of action. Theory was already beginning to move in this 
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direction when the events of the last war taught us better. If war is an 
act of force, the emotions are also necessarily involved in it. If war does not 
originate from them, it still more or less reacts upon them, and the 
degree of this depends not upon the stage of civilization, but upon 
the importance and duration of the hostile interests. If, therefore, we 
find that civilized peoples do not put prisoners to death or sack cities 
and lay countries waste, this is because intelligence plays a greater part 
in their conduct of war and has taught them more effective ways of 
applying force than these crude manifestations of instinct.55
This complex of emotion, rationality, and interests cuts across different 
types of societies in various ways to determine how they will pursue their 
war efforts, but no society or war effort is free of hostile intent.
Cooperation as It Is Used
My purpose is not to propose a final definition of cooperation, but rather 
to look at counterintuitive forms of cooperation that are noteworthy in 
the context of warfare, explore their aims and dynamics, and tease out their 
relationships with one another. To that end, the types of cooperation dis-
cussed here cover a range that may not initially appear to constitute coop-
eration at all or may seem unrelated.
In “cooperation,” I include a weak form of intentional cooperation, 
meaning that if a person thinks of himself as cooperating— however he may 
understand that, provided he is not insane or otherwise delusional— with 
the enemy when he engages in certain wartime acts, then I generally take 
it to be cooperation. In these cases, it is the actor’s self- conception that 
matters.
There is a stronger form of intentional cooperation: working jointly with 
the intent to achieve an end that is beneficial for somebody (either the actors 
themselves or a third party) relative to some baseline. This jointness, “with 
other people,” entails some form of communication between the actors, 
which can be very weak: they do not actually have to talk, write, or oth-
erwise correspond directly with one another, as long as there is interaction 
that allows a person to infer information. When two men get into a boat, 
both will row their oars in sync, says David Hume, even without having 
explicitly discussed an agreement to do so. If a producer of the same product 
chiu18244_2nd_i-326.indb   21 7/12/19   12:05 PM
[ 22 ] T H E  H O R RO R S  O F  WA R  A N D  T H E  N AT U R E  O F  C O O P E R AT I O N 
-1—
0—
+1—
that I make raises his prices at the same time every year, I might be able to 
infer that he wants me to join in an oligopolistic alliance. If the enemy 
shells my trench at the same time every day, I might be able to infer that 
he will do the same tomorrow, and would like me to reciprocate. Con-
ventions and agreements can arise tacitly, “without the interposition of a 
promise,” as Hume describes, simply by “referenc[ing]” the actions of the 
other and performing on the basis of a “supposition” of the other’s perfor-
mance.56 Such indirect communication is encompassed within the next 
requirement, of strategic action.
Jointness also requires strategic, rather than parametric, action. Strategic 
action involves responsiveness to others’ moves and is game- theoretic; in con-
trast, parametric action is choice- theoretic, more like responding to nature.57
Jointness can entail but does not require collective agency or collective 
planning, however.58 For example, when a large group of people is trying 
to get into a tennis stadium in time for the opening serve, the individuals 
are all cooperating with one another under the constraints presented by 
others wanting the same thing. In this case, they are working jointly and 
responding strategically to others’ actions, but cannot be said to constitute 
a collective agent. As Schelling has shown, this kind of coordination can 
occur even when the parties are in different places and unable to commu-
nicate with one another, and when there are any number of equilibrium 
solutions with similar payoffs for all parties (and therefore no obviously 
“right” or “better” answer). Under these circumstances, they will tend to 
choose the most prominent or conspicuous solution, which is “some focal 
point for each person’s expectation of what the other expects him to expect 
to be expected to do.”59
Tacit human convention can give rise to explicit rules and institutions, as 
Hume argues about the origins of justice and property— “it arises gradually, 
and acquires force by a slow progression, and by our repeated experience of the 
inconveniences of transgressing it.”60 Even more surprisingly, rules and insti-
tutions can be derived from tacit and unspoken coordination even under 
the high- stakes life- or- death situations of active war, as we shall see with the 
development of some strong (but never explicitly negotiated) norms of war as 
well as the legal institutionalization of certain previously tacit rules of war.
In both weaker and stronger senses, cooperation between enemies in 
warfare does not require direct communication, collective agency or 
planning, positive sentiment (e.g., altruism, fellow feeling), shared goals (each 
person could have the same goal), or even mutually beneficial outcomes to 
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the actors themselves. Nor does it preclude selfish motivation— in fact, it is 
often driven by self- interest.
The Ethic of Cooperation in Warfare
Despite the antagonistic nature of warfare— in which participants try to 
kill one another— soldiers, states, and other entities will still intentionally 
cooperate with one another, often in ways that make it harder for them to 
win.61 This intent matters even if the actual behavior or outcome is non-
cooperative, e.g., if the actors are wrong about their actions and effects.
How to Cooperate
Cooperative intent does not have to exist at the level of each individual. 
Actors such as states or international organizations can behave coopera-
tively even if the particular individuals that compose them do not always 
intend that. Cooperation can also be built into institutional structures, such 
as international law. Enemies can work together by establishing formal and 
informal practices within war or the rules restricting war. General agree-
ment on the norms of warfare does not necessarily include concurrence 
on how to justify them, however. Actors can cooperate in a variety of ways 
and for different reasons, including:
1. Cooperation for shared goals (e.g., team- building activities):
This is the cooperation that people most readily think of, when all par-
ties have the same goal and its content applies to each party in the same or 
compatible way(s). Cooperation itself may be the goal, such as in a com-
pany team- building activity to transport a bucket of water using only des-
ignated methods. Or people might also cooperate for an external shared 
goal with either noncompetitive (e.g., playing a Brahms symphony) or com-
petitive ends (e.g., a Tour de France cycling team trying to drive its leader 
to victory). These take place within definitive structures and constraining 
rules of action, but there can also be less- defined contexts, such as neigh-
bors building a community garden, random passersby pulling a car out of 
a ditch, or different military branches (army, navy, air force) engaging in 
joint- force operations.
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2. Cooperation for the same, but not shared, goals (e.g., chess game opponents, 
dueling fencers):
In competitive games with a limited number of winners, each player 
holds the same, but not shared, goal of winning the match, as that could 
only be achieved at others’ expense. Participants cooperate nonetheless, 
first, by entering into the competition, as there would be no activity with-
out the requisite number of players; then they play according to rules that 
restrict how the pieces/players move, specify how and when players may 
interact (e.g., taking turns), and define how to win. Without players’ mutual 
cooperation in abiding by the rules, there could be no competition as con-
ceived. Any defined competition, mental or athletic, requires such coop-
eration in order for one to beat the others and the competition to yield an 
outcome. Cooperation in warfare is most frequently of this kind: each side 
has the same goal of winning, but can only do so at the others’ expense 
(by killing the other), under the constraints of whatever rules or norms 
have been established.
3. Cooperation for a variety of goals— some shared, some same, some different— 
within a shared process/infrastructure (e.g., a social contract perspective of 
society):
Here, cooperation is the shared process or infrastructure within which 
people operate. With so many varying and ever- changing goals in a diverse 
society, the only way people can live together is to mutually abide by spe-
cific rules of engagement, from the most fundamental (e.g., whether or not 
freedom of speech is a principled right) to the most mundane yet practical 
(e.g., which side of the road to drive on). In warfare, the institution of inter-
national law has a similar structure— everyone enters the activity with 
different, same, conflicting, concurrent, changing goals, but is equally 
bound by the superstructure of the law.
The peculiar thing about cooperation in warfare is not only that there is 
cooperation at all— already significant in itself— but that there is beyond that 
an ethic of cooperation in warfare, a belief that it is right to cooperate in war. 
This ethic is more than mere pursuit of self- interest, for it often cuts against 
that. Even when cooperation clearly promotes everyone’s self- interest,62 
other motivations creep in as well. For example, a veteran of the World War 
I trenches cajoled his more eager companion: “Come on, let sleeping dogs 
lie. If we was to throw a bomb you can bet your boots the old Bosche would 
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chuck one back, and Mr. Digby and Mr ’Arris (the soldiers occupying the 
sap) . . .  are both married men. Wouldn’t be cricket would it?”63
Disturbing the peace would only prove disastrous for soldiers and their 
families. Still, it is not the only impetus. The appeal to “cricket” entreats 
the other soldier to also consider the importance of fairness and reciproc-
ity, above and beyond and perhaps against one’s own interests— that because 
the opponent restrains himself, perhaps one should too.
The Legitimating Effect of Cooperation
Whether or not it is used as such, war is commonly thought of as a last 
resort after further negotiation and compromise appear impossible. When 
something seems so important, unjust, or intractable that there is no 
recourse save violence, it is also natural to deem the enemy so repulsive as 
to be worth killing. So when there is cooperation, not only are military 
leaders incensed at the damage to military interests, but the population is 
also often outraged at the seeming treachery. Soldiers can be court- martialed 
or executed for simply declining to kill the enemy when given the oppor-
tunity, much less colluding with them on or off the battlefield.
For example, the prisoner exchange in May 2014 between the United 
States and the Taliban— Army PFC Bowe Bergdahl for five Taliban fight-
ers detained at Guantánamo— was controversial amongst both Americans 
and Taliban across the political spectrum.64 There were practical fears about 
whether the exchange served American interests, as the Taliban fighters 
would be released to Qatar, where they would be allowed to move freely, 
and no US officials would be involved in their oversight.65
Of the other concerns,66 perhaps the most significant was that although 
discussions leading to the exchange were limited and unlikely to presage 
any broader peace talks,67 many Americans were troubled by the possibil-
ity that negotiations and agreements might confer international legitimacy 
upon the Taliban— something the latter seeks but which the international 
community has resisted granting.68 Then US secretary of state Hillary 
Clinton recounted:
I was asked if “it would be a surprise and maybe even disturbing” 
for Americans to hear that we were trying to reconcile with some 
insurgents even as the President was sending more U.S. troops to 
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fight the very same Taliban. . . .  Could sworn enemies actually 
come to some kind of understanding that would end a war and 
rebuild a shattered country? After so many years of fighting, it was 
hard enough to sit together and talk face- to- face, let alone trust one 
another. . . .  I acknowledged . . .  that opening the door to negotia-
tions with the Taliban would be hard to swallow for many Ameri-
cans after so many years of war. Reintegrating low- level fighters 
was odious enough; negotiating directly with top commanders 
was something else entirely.69
American officials stated that they could not cite another time in which 
the United States exchanged prisoners in an unconventional, insurgent 
conflict.70 In fact, the United States has negotiated with terrorist groups in 
the past— including the “arms for hostages” Iran- Contra scandal, which 
resulted in the release, and then replacement kidnappings, of three 
hostages71— but that was an anomaly, as it usually takes a heavy hand with 
terrorists and rarely pays ransoms for hostages.72
More than a lack of precedent on this matter, however, it was the very 
idea of doing business— even a self- interested trade— with the enemy that 
was anathema for many. It is difficult to accept cooperation with someone 
who has been and is trying to destroy you, and whom you have been and 
are trying to destroy in turn. Animosity and mistrust, not to mention inev-
itable villainization of the other, compound over time, making it hard to 
imagine cooperating even with former enemies to pursue one’s self- 
interest,73 much less with a current one.
The principle of nonnegotiation with terrorists is meant to not only 
deter future terroristic acts, but also withhold conferring legitimacy to ter-
rorist groups.74 It reflects a belief that terrorists, by dint of their uncon-
ventional tactics, are untrustworthy— further reason to deny their political 
legitimacy.
Cooperation unwittingly accords a modicum of respect, trust, and rec-
ognition of humanity, which is exactly why cooperating with one’s oppo-
nent (terrorist or otherwise) does lend him a veneer of legitimacy, and why 
negotiating with terrorist groups is controversial— it appears to confer not 
just political legitimacy to the organizations, but also moral legitimacy to 
their military tactics.
Can cooperation occur in isolation without any implications for legiti-
macy? Several editorials expressed hope that the 2014 US/Taliban prisoner 
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exchange would lead to further dialogue, resulting in a broader reconcili-
ation or larger peace agreement. For example:
On balance, the exchange made sense. . . .  The release is part of a 
broader effort . . .  to engage with the Taliban as the U.S. war effort 
winds down, and rightly so. . . .  If the U.S.’s exit from Afghanistan 
is not to end in disaster for the people of that country, there must be 
some kind of accommodation between their government and the Tal-
iban. By releasing the five Taliban commanders, the administration 
hoped not just to get Bergdahl back, but also to move that larger pro-
cess along.75
The Bergdahl deal may serve as a prelude to a wider set of talks with 
the Taliban. . . .  Spokesmen for both sides stressed that the deal just 
made was a prisoner- exchange deal and nothing more— that no fur-
ther inferences should be made. But American officials from Presi-
dent Obama on down have stressed that a good end to this war can 
only be a negotiated end, that it must involve an accord with all the 
factions, and the Taliban are a homegrown faction. Maybe the Berg-
dahl deal will serve as a prelude to a wider set of talks— in which 
case this will be looked back upon as a very good day.76
But what if this prisoner exchange is just a one- off and does not lead to 
future negotiation: Would there be something wrong with it? One should 
always work toward the beginning of the end to the war— as the Obama 
administration did— but if, ultimately, it was nothing more than a pris-
oner exchange for the limited purpose of recovering one’s soldier, it would 
be nothing strange or even necessarily incorrect.
Some commentators erroneously claimed that “prisoner exchanges gen-
erally come when hostilities have ceased,”77 but they can be commonplace 
even in the midst of conflict and do not necessarily indicate any movement 
toward reconciliation or resolution. During the four- century war between 
the Arab Caliphate and the Byzantine Empire (629– 1050s ad), for exam-
ple, almost two dozen prisoner exchanges were recorded over nearly two 
centuries (late eighth through mid- tenth centuries ad). Amid continuous 
raiding activity, the two empires exchanged prisoners, sometimes by the 
thousands, by having them simultaneously walk across bridges over the 
Lamis river on their shared borderland.78
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In recent times, some countries such as Israel, the United Kingdom, and 
France have been more willing to exchange hostages,79 and there is a long 
history of successful trades, including with terrorist groups. Since its incep-
tion in 1948, Israel has frequently traded with its various Arab enemies, 
releasing over eight thousand prisoners in dozens of exchanges in the past 
three decades alone for Israeli citizens, amid what could be considered a 
single, continuous— albeit complicated and ever- changing— quarrel. The 
myriad bilateral antagonisms in the region (involving Israel, Egypt, Pales-
tine, Syria, Iran, and others) are all part of this complex conflict, with cross- 
cutting interests and shifting microalliances, and the numerous prisoner 
exchanges involving tens of thousands of people have not been harbingers 
of any greater resolution.
While most exchanges were with established states (e.g., Syria, Egypt, 
Lebanon), many were with Palestinian and other Arab political groups it 
does not recognize or classifies as terrorist, including Fatah, the Demo-
cratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), Hamas, and Hezbol-
lah. Recently, in 2011, Hamas released Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit, whom it 
had captured in 2006, in exchange for 1,027 Palestinian prisoners held by 
Israel.80 One has even seen successful hostage exchange involving Boko 
Haram, a militant Islamic group in Nigeria so extreme it is shunned by 
many others— here, eighty- two of nearly three hundred kidnapped school-
girls for some militant commanders.81
Clearly, cooperation can take place between enemies— not just between 
conventional opponents in a structured, iterated game, but also under less 
organized or stable circumstances— that does not necessarily confer legiti-
macy. Limited pockets of cooperation can and often do punctuate a lon-
ger, sustained conflict, without any contradictions: enemies can negotiate 
over smaller issues, make agreements in good faith, and keep their word, 
whether or not the other side is an organized political faction, while simul-
taneously warring against each other in the broader context.82
Modern Institutionalization of Cooperation and the Rise 
of International Law
Different forms of cooperation can be arrayed along a spectrum of defined 
organization and design. At the more structured end, one might find some-
thing like redistributive welfare, in which citizens must pay a prescribed 
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percentage of their income and spending in taxes but the particular use of 
these revenues is left to the vagaries of political negotiations. In the middle 
of the spectrum, where processes are less constraining, there is, for example, 
competition between businesses for market share. Beyond the cooperation 
of obeying laws for product safety, copyright, antiprotectionist or antimo-
nopolist practices, or other commercial restrictions, actors are free to do 
almost anything else: they might choose to improve on an existing prod-
uct, create something radically different to do the same thing but better, or 
something else, so it is also not a zero- sum game. At the more amorphous 
end of cooperative enterprises would be spontaneous orders, e.g., develop-
ment of a language or emergence of the use of money.
Usually, cooperative effects without cooperative intent are not particu-
larly significant, as they can be produced quite accidentally,83 but it is note-
worthy when an ethic of cooperation is built in at a higher structural level. 
The most striking example of such institutionalized cooperation is the 
establishment and widespread acceptance (at least in name) of international 
warfare law. Such cooperation, for example, the ban on hollow- point bul-
lets, generates something that looks quite different from individual coop-
eration to maintain “live and let live” in the World War I trenches: How 
can they both be considered manifestations of the same phenomenon, an 
ethic of cooperation in warfare?
In some areas, cooperation is scalable, from the level of the individual 
actor through intermediary levels to the institution, for example, with 
expectations for POW treatment.84 At other times, the form of coopera-
tive ethic is fairly unique, as with “live and let live,” and cannot be insti-
tutionalized into law. In both cases, cooperation can be considered a good, 
a positive reason to engage in the action, independent of the other reasons 
for that action.
Adherence to the law requires the cooperation of all relevant actors 
(nation- states, soldiers, and everyone in between), not just between adver-
saries, but also internally, by domestic authorities enforcing the interna-
tional laws on their own populations. National and international institu-
tions can enable actors’ cooperation, or the institutions themselves can be 
the object of cooperation, such that individuals operating under those laws 
are primarily rule- following with or without cooperative intent. In the lat-
ter case, the intent to cooperate still exists, but not necessarily for each act-
ing individual; the institutions and rules form the cooperative structure 
and embody cooperative intent.
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In between self- interested and intentionally- cooperative conduct lies 
behavior such as rule- following, and at times, the ethic of cooperation in 
warfare appears to be merely rule- following. The two can look similar, 
especially when international law prescribes cooperation as a means or an 
end such that cooperation in warfare then entails rule- following.
But cooperation can contradict the rules or engage where they are silent. 
“Live and let live” clearly flouted regulations and defied the wishes of high 
command, for example, while ad hoc decisions to spare someone out of a 
sense of fairness arise in the absence of established rules or expectations or 
after all the rules have been obeyed. So there is no clean relationship 
between cooperation and rule- following.
As with most human action, mixed motivations are the norm in the 
business of warfare. There are moments when people think that coopera-
tion itself has moral purchase, but the desire to cooperate usually functions 
alongside and is buttressed by other rationales— foremost among them the 
self- interested desire to survive— and cooperation can be a means to an end.
It is also sometimes the case that soldiers engaged in cooperative behav-
ior do not necessarily think of it as such, but that does not mean they are 
not cooperating. For example, says a US Marine deployed in Afghanistan 
in 2009– 10, one of the major strategies was to establish a rapport and bro-
ker deals with locals so that they would see it was in their best interests not 
to fight the Americans: “We thought of it as building relationships, and if 
they wanted to fight, we’d fight. Sometimes multiple times a day. But if 
someone wanted to reach out to my extended hand, we’d negotiate, and 
sometimes we’d do that several times a day. . . .  We had a mutual interest 
in survival. The Marines wanted to go home alive, and they didn’t want 
us to burn their houses down.”85
Motives evolve as well. The wearing of uniforms in combat is an inter-
esting case of something that started for one reason— the internal objec-
tives of imposing discipline and professionalism on a previously disordered 
militia and solidifying loyalty to the sovereign from mercenary fighters— 
that was later superseded by others, including (a) reciprocally and coop-
eratively protecting civilians, such that soldiers accept the disadvantages of 
uniforms on the understanding that their opponents do the same, and 
(b) shielding civilians on the grounds of innocence or human rights.
We are in a period of transition in international ethics, and the justifi-
cations for various international laws are in flux. This does not obviate any 
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original cooperative ethic that motivated those laws, and its evolution across 
a wide range of issues demonstrates its breadth, intensity, and depth.
By “evolution,” I do not mean that there has been some kind of natural 
selection for cooperative behavior such that it is considered more “fit” for 
or more “right” in warfare— although now there is clearly institutional 
reward via international and national law. Neither do I imply any teleo-
logical claim about the development of cooperation over time, as institu-
tionalized cooperation is associated with both more and fewer moral atroc-
ities. The ethic of cooperation in warfare emerges and manifests itself 
inconsistently, in different ways and in varied settings throughout the his-
tory of warfare, and, like evolution, there is nothing teleological about it. 
It would be difficult to trace a clear progression of increasing cooperation 
overall, even accounting for halting development and setbacks.
That said, there is, however, something unique about the ethic of 
cooperation in warfare during the modern period, when it slowly gets 
systematized in international law and its accompanying institutions. Obvi-
ously, there are many ways to fight other than elaborate set pieces à la the 
Napoleonic era, but modern warfare, which developed in conjunction 
with the modern nation- state, has many distinctive features. Most visible 
are massive national armies who, for the first time, expected to die for 
their national homelands rather than for a god, lord, or paymaster. Along 
with the swelling size of armies grew the scale of war itself and the indus-
trial production of weaponry, and this required management by a central 
bureaucracy.86
In addition to the military’s institutional, organizational, and techno-
logical advances, modern warfare is also characterized by the development 
of governing codes of conduct and international laws that embody and pri-
oritize certain cooperative values, e.g., yielding decisive outcomes.
These explicit international laws and treaties differ from the limiting 
principles and edicts of warfare previously issued by, for example, kings or 
religious leaders, in three related ways:
 1. Universalizability: Adherence to religious edicts hinges on belief in that 
religion and political orders on loyalty to the king, for example. In con-
trast, contemporary international laws of warfare are universal in appli-
cability, as modern just war doctrines purport to speak to all states and 
to all human beings in those states. Compliance with the law is not 
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grounded in membership in particular states or groups of states or in 
certain religious beliefs.
 2. Nonreliance on comprehensive doctrines: Even as religious edicts can per-
suade only specific audiences, they still make comprehensive claims,87 
whereas contemporary international law does not rely on similarly- 
comprehensive doctrines and seeks instead to be universalizable. Inter-
national law could be justified by appeal to certain comprehensive 
doctrines, but its acceptance does not depend upon holding a particular 
religious faith or nationalism. Rather, it rests on some overlapping con-
sensus, whatever form that might take, and is universalizable in both 
justification and application.
 3. Legal specificity: Finally, these international laws carry with them much 
more possibility for legal specificity, because their associated courts build 
up a body of case law through the process of adjudication. How a law 
applies in particular circumstances is better worked out in a court sys-
tem than when promulgated by kings and priests, as courts actually hear 
cases, and from a variety of traditions and religious backgrounds. The 
ensuing body of case law built by the international judicial structure 
gives us better understanding of what that law means in specific cases 
than we had with canon law, e.g., Christian doctrine, which offers less 
detail for its application and would have pertained only to certain areas 
(e.g., Europe). In contrast, international law applies to all states and 
types of regime— whether imperial, anarchic, or other— and provides 
greater specificity, over a broader range of cases.
The development of established codes of conduct and international laws 
in the modern period shows that not all morality is lost in warfare. Coop-
eration is obviously motivated in large part by practical and self- interested 
considerations, but not entirely. One can interpret the law of armed con-
flict (LOAC) as yet another tool wielded by the more powerful states to 
oppress weaker ones; as Thrasymachus explains, “justice is . . .  the advan-
tage of the stronger,” for “rulers proclaim that what is to their own advan-
tage is just for those who are ruled by them.”88
It is not so easy to rig the structure in one’s favor, however. As Machia-
velli counsels the prince: the law alone is insufficient, and he must contest 
by both law and force, in the way “proper” to man and beast respectively, 
while simultaneously disguising his actions, “to be a great pretender and 
dissembler” such that his deception remains hidden and that he continue 
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“to appear merciful, faithful, humane, honest.”89 This is a tall order indeed, 
one at which most princes fail.
Once established, rules can take on a life of their own and serve as a 
touchstone. The content and structure of international laws of war do make 
it harder to win, which is why even stronger countries and their soldiers 
repeatedly try to break the rules.
The widespread institutionalization of wartime cooperation in interna-
tional law has not been seen at any other time in history and it may not 
last, but it is the vehicle for one of the major features of morality in warfare— 
the ethic of cooperation and reciprocity between both allies and enemies— 
and it has implications for warfare and for the international political structure. 
Even in the most appalling of human activities, there is systematic, self- 
imposed legal restraint, such as banning hollow point bullets (Hague Con-
vention, 1899) or regulating prisoner- of- war treatment (from the Peace of 
Westphalia of 1648 through the Geneva Conventions of 1949). Most nota-
ble is that formalized cooperation has bred normative expectations— and 
perhaps normative duties— of future collaboration.
Civilization in War
If civilization has an opposite, it is war.
Of these two things, you have either one or the other. Not both.
— URSULA K. LE GUIN, THE LEFT HAND OF DARKNESS
The overwhelmingly dominant influence on contemporary international 
military ethics is the particular just war tradition that grew out of Augus-
tinian and Thomist thought, which holds that the conduct of warfare should 
be constrained primarily by the principles of proper authority, just cause, 
and right intention, and then guided by considerations of last resort, pro-
portionality, and probability of success. It would be difficult to overesti-
mate the role that the secular inspirations from these principles play in the 
contemporary ethics training of Western militaries and in the content of 
established international laws. Emphasis on this canon, however, has meant 
that we have overlooked a significant thread running through different 
doctrines of military ethics across time and cultures.
Not only do people engage in ad hoc cooperation in war, but they are 
also influenced by an ethic of cooperation between enemies that has been 
chiu18244_2nd_i-326.indb   33 7/12/19   12:05 PM
[ 34 ] T H E  H O R RO R S  O F  WA R  A N D  T H E  N AT U R E  O F  C O O P E R AT I O N 
-1—
0—
+1—
in play throughout human history. Given the violent, combative nature of 
war and what is at stake in its pursuit, the existence of this moral principle 
is surprising, yet simultaneously so commonplace that it defines the idea of 
modern warfare in largely unnoticed ways. Cooperation between enemies 
coexists with them trying to kill one another.
This book conducts a genealogical exploration of three different forms 
that the ethic of cooperation in warfare can take and shows how it has 
defined the idea of modern warfare in several— contradictory— ways. The 
three forms I discuss are merely a subset of broader cooperation. There are 
collaborations in war that I will not study, for example, that which intends 
to bring harm to a third party (e.g., conspiracies between military, indus-
try, and political interests or the- enemy- of- my- enemy- is- my- friend). This 
is not because they are less common or important— only that they are 
unsurprising.
The ethic of cooperation between enemies in warfare is unexpected and 
perhaps unique in that there can be conscious intent to collaborate for some 
separate benefit, even while trying to impose the ultimate harm by killing 
the other. That is why the ethics of cooperation in warfare that are most 
interesting and counterintuitive draw from a common conception of coop-
eration as understood by most who engage in it, even if the practitioners 
themselves would not describe it that way. Understanding the ethic of 
cooperation in warfare is essential because various forms of this ethos have 
made their way into the practice of warfare and just war theory unspoken 
and unseen, so it is critical to recognize when militaries and soldiers act in 
terms of and are motivated by a cooperative ethic.
There are different ways to categorize cooperation in warfare, includ-
ing by level (e.g., individuals, battalion units, states) or method (e.g., ad 
hoc negotiations, institutionalized rules, international law). Here, I look 
at cooperation by its purpose, and in particular three types (which are not 
exhaustive): (1) to set up a “fair fight,” as soldiers commonly understand it, 
(2) to minimize damage to particular classes of individuals, and (3) to end 
the war quickly and/or definitively in order to minimize overall damage.
Studying it in this way reveals important tensions within the practice of 
war, between warfare and the ethic of cooperation, and between the dif-
ferent types of this ethic, and I then explore the limits of cooperation and 
its inconsistencies. Finally, I delve into the role that cooperation plays in 
the broader superstructure of warfare itself, in particular the relationship 
between war and politics, the international law’s focus on jus in bello and 
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relative silence on jus ad bellum, and determinations about legitimacy in war, 
the last of which helps to explain some of modern nation- states’ inability 
to engage favorably with noncooperative forms of warfare.
Attempts to place constraints on war can be seen in light of the broad 
contexts of pacification, civilization, and humanitarianism. In addressing 
the “logic of violence,” cognitive psychologist Steven Pinker turns to 
evolution:
Nature does not consist of one big bloody melee. . . .  If you attack 
one of your own kind, your adversary may be as strong and pugna-
cious as you are, and armed with the same weapons and defenses. The 
likelihood that, in attacking a member of your own species, you will 
get hurt is a powerful selection pressure that disfavors indiscriminate 
pouncing or lashing out. It also rules out the hydraulic metaphor and 
most folk theories of violence, such as thirst for blood, a death wish, 
a killer instinct, and other destructive . . .  impulses. When a tendency 
toward violence evolves, it is always strategic. Organisms are selected 
to deploy violence only in circumstances where the expected bene-
fits outweigh the expected costs.90
There are limits to analogizing from animal fighting to human warfare, 
especially when large- scale modern warfare seems to have thrown off any 
evolutionary constraints. At the same time, although contemporary war is 
an unusually bloody melee, one finds evidence of intelligent constraint. 
This book is about some of those different forms of intelligent constraint, 
which is as much a part of the story of war as its savagery.
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